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NOTES

The Title VII Tug-of-War: Application
of U.S. Employment Discrimination
Law Extraterritorially
ABSTRACT

Companies around the world increasingly are engaging in
cross-border business transactions. Globalization is a must if
companies want to continue to be competitive in
the
marketplace-indeed it is an inevitable reality. However, in the
midst of this reality is another reality: the legal implications of
establishing operations abroad.
Transnational expansion
introduces companies to an interesting game of tug-of-war in
which companies may find themselves torn between compliance
with U.S. law and compliance with the laws of the host country.
This Note discusses this tug-of-war in the context of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Over 15 years ago, it was
debatable whether Title VII applied extraterritorially, but
Congress has since answered this question in the affirmative.
However, one victory only created more hurdles. These hurdles,
for purposes of this Note, are the "employee question" and the
"law question." With respect to the former, the basic question is:
What is the proper scope of Title VII's extraterritorialemployee
coverage? With respect to the latter, the question is: What
constitutes a conflict of "law" sufficient to permit an employer to
avoid compliance with Title VII? These are critical questions,
the resolution of which is necessary in order to preserve Title
VII's effectiveness. This Note offers suggestions as to how each
question should be resolved. Each resolution starts from the
basic premise that Title VII can only go so far without
sacrificing its effectiveness. The challenge is recognizing Title
VII's limitations and finding alternative resolutions for those
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situations to which Title VII realisticallycannot apply, and this
challenge is precisely the objective of the Note.
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INTRODUCTION

Walmart's current global operation includes locations in
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, South Korea,
Mexico, and the United Kingdom, with a total of 2,229 locations

TITLE VII TUG-OF-WAR

2007]

worldwide. 1 Other companies in the race for international expansion
include McDonald's (which currently has almost 18,000 restaurants
outside the United States); 2 Pfizer (which recently opened a $410
million epilepsy drug factory in Singapore); 3 and Johnson & Johnson
(which has nearly 38% of its factory space in Europe, up from 23% a
decade ago). 4 These companies reflect only a trivial percentage of
companies currently engaging in cross-border business practices. The
multinational enterprise (MNE)-a company owning, controlling, and
managing products or providing services in more than one countryis a given feature of today's economic market. 5 Companies' rationales
for globalizing their operations include, but are not limited to, the
desire to keep up with the competition, inexpensive labor, host
government tax breaks, and foreign government giveaways, such as
selling property at discounted rates and imposing fewer restrictions
on business operations. 6 For companies with sufficient capital and
the desire to expand to the foreign market, these perks counter any
reluctance they may have about going global.
From a business and economic perspective, going global may be
an inevitable reality, a part of the natural progression for a company
looking to maximize profits. However, from a legal standpoint,
transnational expansion introduces companies to an interesting game
of tug-of-war in which companies may find themselves torn between
compliance with U.S. law and compliance with the laws of a host
country. At the heart of this game of tug-of-war is the problem of
jurisdiction-the jurisdiction of U.S. courts over MNEs engaging in
conduct in violation of federal law versus the desire of the host
government to control foreign investor business practices. 7 This Note
discusses that jurisdictional war in the context of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 8 Title VII prohibits the discriminatory
treatment of employees on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin.9 The extent to which this prohibition should apply to
workers employed abroad by U.S. companies is an issue that has

1.
Hoovers, Walmart Stores, Inc.
Company Record, available at
http:/premium.hoovers.comlsubscribe/co/ops.xhtml?ID=ffffrrjfffhrshkkjs (last visited
Mar. 26, 2007).
2.
Hoovers, McDonalds Corp. Company Record, available at http://premium.
hoovers.com/subscribe/co/ops.xhtml?ID=ffffrfskcfcrhyctjc (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
3.
Jim Hopkins, Drugmakers Shift More Production Outside USA, USA
TODAY, Oct. 19, 2004, at B1, available at http://www.usatoday.comlmoney/industries/
healthdrugs/2004-10-19-moving-productionx.htm.
4.
Id.
5.
Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise
Responsibility: CorporateCodes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075,
1077 (2002).
6.
Hopkins, supra note 3.
7.
See, e.g., Westfield, supra note 5, at 1086-90.
8.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006).

9.

Id. § 2000e-2(a).
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sparked an appreciable degree of scholarly debate and judicial
scrutiny.10 Congress has definitively provided that Title VII does
apply to the foreign operations of U.S.-controlled companies," but
despite this definitive answer, a number of questions have surfaced
pertaining to the precise scope of Title VII's extraterritorial effect.
This Note focuses on two questions regarding this
extraterritorial effect: (1) what is the proper scope of Title VII's
definition of employee as applied to the foreign operation, and (2) to
what extent should employers have the ability to invoke the foreign
compulsion defense to avoid Title VII's extraterritorial application?
Part II of this Note provides a brief historical overview of how
Congress approaches the application of federal statutes outside the
United States as a general matter. It then summarizes Title VII's
evolution since its inception in 1964 and discusses the
extraterritoriality problem specifically in the context of Title VII.
Part III discusses the ongoing debate as to the proper scope of Title
VII's definition of employee and discusses the foreign compulsion
defense as a potential escape device from Title VII's extraterritorial
application. Part IV offers suggestions about how the definition of
employee might be expanded without sacrificing Title VII's
effectiveness and how the foreign compulsion defense might be
amended to provide more guidance for when an employer can
properly invoke it.

II.BACKGROUND
A. The ExtraterritorialityProblem: Congress'sApproach to the
Application of FederalStatutes Outside the United States
In order to appreciate the tension surrounding the application of
Title VII extraterritorially, it is important to understand the
evolution of Congress's general approach to the application of federal

10.
See, e.g., Olivia P. Dirig & Mahra Sarosfky, Note, The Argument for Making
American JudicialRemedies Under Title VII Available to Foreign Nationals Employed
by U.S. Companies on Foreign Soil, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 709 (2005); Linda
Maher, Drawing Circles in the Sand: Extraterritorialityin Civil Rights Legislation
After ARAMCO and the Civil Rights Acts of 1991, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993); Mary
Claire St. John, Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of Title VII: The Foreign Compulsion
Defense and Principlesof InternationalComity, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 869 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). This definitive answer is much more than what
11.
Congress has provided with respect to other federal statutes, so to a certain extent
Title VII is "ahead of the game" on cross-border application of federal statutes. For
example, Congress has yet to provide explicitly for the extraterritorial application of
the National Labor Relations Act. See generally Todd Keithley, Note, Does the
National Labor Relations Act Extend to Americans Who Are Temporarily Abroad?, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2135 (2005) (discussing whether the National Labor Relations Act
should apply to U.S. citizens employed abroad).
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statutes beyond the borders of the United States. Courts have
grappled with the question of extraterritorially applying federal law
for over two centuries. 12
Although acknowledging Congress's
authority to apply and enforce federal laws abroad, 13 courts
historically were hesitant to rule on the basis of this authority. 14 In
an effort to "protect against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord,"
courts established a presumption that U.S. law applies only within
U.S. boundaries. 15 This governing principle, referred to as the
"presumption against extraterritoriality,"' 1 6 became and remains a
longstanding principle of U.S. law 17 and, at least theoretically,
continues to be the backdrop against which courts examine the
application of all U.S. statutes in foreign territories.
The
presumption may be overcome by a clear statement from Congress
8
that a statute was intended to apply abroad.'
Justifications for the presumption include international law
limitations, the desire to maintain consistency with domestic conflict
of law rules, the need to protect against international discord, the
need to maintain separation of judicial and legislative powers, and
the predictability value of the presumption. 19 However, despite the
justifications for and the longstanding nature of the presumption,
courts have applied it in a variety of ways. From its inception
through the early part of the twentieth century, courts applied the
presumption reflexively to almost all federal statutes. 20 In the early
twentieth century, courts began recognizing exceptions to the rule. 21
The earliest exception was on the basis of the effect that the foreign
' 22
conduct was having in the United States-the "effects exception.

12.
Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the ExtraterritorialApplication of
U.S. Environmental Statutes: A Proposalfor an Integrated Judicial StandardBased on
the Continuum of Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 91 (2006).
13.
See EEOC v. Arabian. Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949)); see also Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
14.
See Abate, supra note 12, at 92.
15.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
16.
Id. (citing Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
17.
The application of the presumption against extraterritoriality dates back to
1906 in the case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
According to the American Banana court, "construction of any statute [sic] [is] intended
to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power. 'All legislation is prima facie territorial."'
Id. at 357 (quoting Ex parte Blain, In re Sawers, 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528; State v. Carter,
27 N.J.L. 499 (1859); People v. Merrill, 2 Parker, Crim. Rep. 590, 596).
18.
See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
19.
William
S.
Dodge,
Understanding the
Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 90 (1998).

20.
21.
22.

Abate, supra note 12, at 91-93.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 93-94.
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Under this exception, federal law could be applied abroad where one
could demonstrate that the extraterritorial conduct had substantial
domestic effects. 23 The "effects exception" had the practical effect of
providing employers with a legitimate way to escape the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 24 Indeed, it may be partially responsible
25
for the presumption's decline in significance by the 1980s.
By the early 1990s, courts were applying the presumption
inconsistently and subjecting it to many exceptions. 26 It was not until
the 1990s that the presumption resurfaced as a strict bar to
extraterritorial application. Since then, it has continued to arise
across legal disciplines including securities law, 27 environmental
law, 28 antitrust law, 29 bankruptcy law, 30 copyright law, 31 and
employment law. 32 In certain of these disciplines, courts have found
the requisite clear statement from Congress that the applicable
statute was intended to apply abroad; in other instances, courts have
refused to do so. 33 Fortunately, with respect to Title VII, Congress
explicitly stated the law applies to U.S. employers operating abroad, a

23
See id. These "effects" were generally economic in nature. Id.
24.
Id. at 94-95.
25.
Id. at 95.
26.
Id. at 91.
27.
See, e.g., Corinne A. Falencki, Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality,36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1211 (2004).
28.
See, e.g., Abate, supra note 12.
29.
See, e.g., Michael G. McKinnon, Comment, Federal Judicialand Legislative
Jurisdiction Over Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law and Viable
Solutions Beyond the Timberlane/RestatementComity Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1219
(1994) (discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality in the antitrust law
context).
30.
See, e.g., David B. Stratton, Reflections on the ExtraterritorialApplication
of the Bankruptcy Code, 24-7 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44 (2005).
31.
See, e.g., Christopher R. Perry, Exporting American Copyright Law, 37
GONZ. L. REV. 451 (2002); Nathan R. Wollman, Maneuvering Through the Landmines
of Multiterritorial Copyright Litigation: How to Avoid the Presumption Against
ExtraterritorialityWhen Attempting to Recover for the Foreign Exploitation of U.S.
Copyrighted Works, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 343 (2002).
32.
See, e.g., Dirig & Sarosfky, supra note 10; Mary M. Madden, Strengthening
Protection of Employees at Home and Abroad: The ExtraterritorialApplication of Title
VI1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 20
HAMLINE L. REV. 739 (1996-97); Maher, supra note 10; St. John, supra note 10.
33.
For example, courts have been willing to find a clear statement in the
employment context but have been reluctant to do so in the bankruptcy
and environmental law contexts. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006) (providing a
clear statement that Title VII applies to U.S. citizens working abroad), and Iwata v.
Stryker Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 600, 603-04 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (discussing that Title VII
does apply to U.S. citizens abroad based on Congress's clear statement), with David M.
Green & Walter Benzija, Spanning the Globe: The Intended ExtraterritorialReach of
the Bankruptcy Code, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 85-87 (2002) ("The question of
the Bankruptcy Code's intended extraterritorial reach has not yet been addressed by
the Supreme Court .... The lower courts that have grappled with the issue of the
Bankruptcy Code's intended extraterritorial reach have been decidedly inconsistent in
their analysis.").
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statement which courts have since acknowledged and applied. 34
Having cleared the "presumption hurdle," it is possible to move on to
examining the implications of Title VII's application abroad. The
purpose of this Note is to engage in such an examination. However,
before doing so, it is first necessary to provide general background on
Title VII's "journey" to extraterritorial application.
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: An Overview of the Statute
Title VII
opportunities
devices which
disadvantage
"statement of

was enacted in 1964 "to assure equality of employment
and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
of minority citizens." 35 Despite this race-focused
purpose,"36 the actual language of the statute suggests
it was intended to extend beyond the racial context:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer .. to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such
37
individual's race, color, religion, sex or nationalorigin.

This comprehensive language readily suggests that Congress
38
intended the protection afforded by Title VII to be far-reaching.
Thus, the extraterritorial application of the Title VII might indeed be
in the purview of the statute. However, as will be discussed in Part
III, commentators disagree on just how extensive Title VII's reach
should be in light of the realities of transnational business operation
and the complex nature of doing business internationally.3 9 Before
discussing these differences of opinion, it is first helpful to provide a
brief overview of the events leading up to Congress's decision to apply
Title VII extraterritorially.
Title VII was enacted at a time when courts were routinely
applying U.S. law extraterritorially. Both courts and the Equal
Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) agreed that
companies with operations abroad were required to comply with Title
VII in the two decades following its enactment. 40 During this period,
lower federal courts held in several cases that "United States

34.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); see, e.g., Iwata, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 603-04
(acknowledging and applying Congress's clear statement).
35.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
36.
The statute itself does not provide its purpose. See generally Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17. Rather, this purpose is based on the Supreme
Court's articulation in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800.
37.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(i) (emphasis added).
38.
See Madden, supra note 32, at 744.
39.
See infra Part III.A-B.
40.
See Madden, supra note 32, at 745.
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companies outside the United States had to comply with Title VII."'4 1
The EEOC issued a policy statement in which it explicitly stated that
Title VII applied extraterritorially. 42 Still, the language of Title VII,
particularly the definitional provisions, left sufficient room for courts
to question its cross-border application. Despite the lower courts'
history of routine application of Title VII to foreign operations and
the EEOC's policy statement, the U.S. Supreme Court was not easily
convinced that Title VII should apply extraterritorially.
In the 1991 case EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),
the Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue. 43 This case
involved a naturalized U.S. citizen working in Saudi Arabia for an
U.S. subsidiary of a foreign parent company, Aramco. 44 Upon
discharge, the employee alleged discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, and national origin. 45 The Court, invoking the clear
statement rule, held that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially to
regulate the employment practices of U.S. employers who employed
U.S. citizens abroad. 46 The Court based its holding on the lack of
"sufficient affirmative evidence that Congress intended Title VII to
apply abroad. '4 7 Drawing on the longstanding principle that there is
a presumption against applying U.S. legislation beyond the territorial
United States, 48 the Court interpreted the statute to have a "purely
domestic focus." 49 Despite reaching this conclusion, the Court
expressly invited Congress to amend Title VII to apply abroad. 50 It
was this invitation that ultimately led to a critical turning point in
the extraterritorial application of Title VII abroad, a turning point
51
which originated with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991)
(stating the question presented in the case as "whether Title VII applies
extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of United States employers who
employ United States citizens abroad").
44.
Id. at 247.
45.

Id.

46.
Id. at 258-59.
47.
Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
48.
Id. at 248.
49.
Id. at 255-56.
50.
Id.; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621,
630(0 (2006) ("The term 'employee' includes any individual who is a citizen of the
United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country."); St.
John, supra note 10, at 882 (stating that Congress accepted the Aramco Court's
invitation to amend Title VII by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
51.
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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C. The 1991 Act and Its Implicationsfor the Extraterritoriality
Problem
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act) purported to solve the
extraterritoriality problem by expressly extending Title VII protection
to employees of U.S.-controlled operations working abroad. 52 One of
the stated purposes of the 1991 Act was "to respond to recent
decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant
civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims
of discrimination. ' 53 One of the ways in which Congress effected this
purpose was by expanding the definition of "employee" to cover
employees working abroad. 54 Congress revised the definition of
employee by simply adding to the existing language. 55 Prior to the
1991 Act, the definition of "employee" read as follows:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer,
except that the term employee shall not include any person elected to
public office in any state or political subdivision of any State by the
qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on
such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level
or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal power of the office. The exemption set forth in
the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil
service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political
56
subdivision.

Thus, the basic definition of employee required only that the
individual be employed by an employer in order to qualify for
protection. Notably, the original definition made no reference to the
individual's place of employment. Nor did it make reference to the
individual's nationality. The 1991 Act, however, added the following
language to the end of this definition:
With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term
57
includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.
Presumably, this addition is the clear statement that was lacking at
the time of the Aramco decision. 58 It essentially makes U.S.
employers more susceptible to Title VII claims.
As some
commentators have put it, the expansion of the definition

52.
See id. at sec. 109.
53.
Id. at sec. 3(4), § 1981 note, 105 Stat. at 1071. As the 1991 Act became
effective in November 1991, only six months after the Aramco decision, Aramco is
recognized as one of the key judicial decisions which called Congress to action on this
issue. See, e.g., St. John, supra note 10, at 882 (stating that Congress accepted the
Aramco Court's invitation to amend Title VII by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
54.
See sec. 109(a), § 2000e, 105 Stat. at 1077.
55.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006).
56.
Id.
57.
See id.
58.
See Dirig & Sarofsky, supra note 10, at 718-19.
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"mandate[d] the worldwide application of [U.S.] federal employment
laws. '59 Compliance with respect to employees working in the United
States is no longer sufficient; employers now have to ensure
compliance with respect to employees working at their overseas
operations as well. Part III will demonstrate that disagreement
exists as to the proper degree of this compliance.

III.

THE DEBATES: THE PROPER SCOPE AND THE POTENTIAL TO
ESCAPE-ONGOING CONCERNS REGARDING TITLE VI'S
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION

The primary impetus for the enactment of the 1991 Act was
Congress's desire to correct several court decisions that it believed to
be contrary to the intent of Title VII and to clarify its position on the
statute's extraterritorial application. 60 After the 1991 amendments,
Congress's position was clear-Title VII did apply extraterritorially.
This definitive answer is much more than what Congress has
provided with respect to other federal statutes, 61 so to a certain
extent Title VII is ahead of the game of cross-border application.
Still,
despite
Congress
having
directly
addressed
the
extraterritoriality question, considerable debate exists as to the
proper scope of Title ViI's definition of employee. Section III(A)
examines the perspectives offered by those on the different sides of
this debate. Beyond this debate is the question of an employer's
ability to avoid Title VII's requirements by invoking the foreign
compulsion defense. Section III(B) tackles this question.
A. Debate One: The ProperScope of Title VII's Definition of
Employee-The Employee Question
Whether or not an individual is an employee is important for at
least two reasons: (1) one must be an employee in order to invoke
Title VII protection, 62 and (2) only those considered employees may be
included when determining if an employer meets Title VII's
minimum-employee threshold. 63 The issue at the crux of the

59.
Scott Smith, Comment, ExtraterritorialApplication of Title VII and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Have Statute, Will Travel, 36 S.TEX. L. REV. 191, 192
(1995) (emphasis added).
60.
Robert Belton, Professor, In-class Lecture at Vanderbilt University Law
School on Employment Discrimination (Feb. 1, 2006).
61.
See, e.g., Keithley, supra note 11, at 2135-37.
62.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (discussing unlawful conduct of "an employer").
63.
See id. § 2000e(b) (requiring that an employer have fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year); see also Wildridge v. IER, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 429,
431 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that employees of a French company could be counted for
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employee debate is whether Title VII's current definition of employee
is underinclusive in that it appears to extend extraterritorial
coverage only to U.S. citizens. Presumably, it is based on this specific
inclusion that courts have refused to extend Title VII's substantive
protections to legal permanent residents and foreign nationals
employed abroad. 64
Considering the substantial number of
noncitizens employed by MNEs, the question becomes whether Title
VII's extraterritorial coverage sufficiently protects the vast majority
of the employees of these companies, or whether it protects only a
minority of them. Of course some coverage is better than no coverage,
but if the reasons for denying full protection to certain groups are not
sound, then one must question if this denial is necessary at all and,
on a larger scale, whether it supports the end Title VII seeks to
achieve-comprehensive
protection
against
employment
discrimination. Thus, the main issue addressed in this section is the
adequacy of Title VII's current employee coverage with respect to
extraterritorial employees of U.S.-controlled companies; this is the
'employee question."
Despite Congress's purported clear statement of extraterritorial
application, certain commentators believe that the Title's current
employee coverage is too limited in scope.
According to these
commentators, "general agreement exists that Congress intended
Title VII to provide very broad protection to United States
employees. '65 Those in this camp suggest that Title VII should cover
all employees of the foreign operations, whether they are U.S.
citizens, legal permanent residents, or foreign nationals. 66 The
identity of the individual is irrelevant to the larger task-effective
protection against discriminatory employment practices.67 Without
this extensive coverage, these commentators are concerned that U.S.
employers will establish operations abroad and then, to avoid the
proscriptions of Title VII, hire only legal permanent residents and
foreign nationals instead of hiring U.S. citizens. 68 To prevent
employers from engaging in such unscrupulous practices, "we must

meeting Title VII's minimum-employee threshold); Russell v. Midwest-Werner &
Pfleiderer, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 114, 115 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding that foreign employees
cannot be counted toward the employer's minimum-employee threshold).
64.
See, e.g., Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61 (D.D.C.
2002), aff'd, 409 F.3d 414 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the plaintiff, an Armenian-born
U.S. permanent resident, was not protected by Title VII because he was not a U.S.
citizen); Iwata v. Stryker Corp., 59 F. Supp.2d 600, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that
the plaintiff, a Japanese citizen and U.S. permanent resident, was not protected by
Title VII because he was not a U.S. citizen).
65.
See Madden, supra note 32, at 744. The phrase "United States employee,"
as used by Madden, appears to encompass those employed by U.S. controlled
companies abroad, as opposed to referring to the actual location of the employee.
66.
See, e.g., Dirig & Sarofsky, supranote 10, at 709-11, 749.
67.
Id. at 710-11.
68.
Id.
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make [employers] liable for the discriminatory actions they are
'69
responsible for, regardless of who those actions are taken against.
Otherwise, employers will "shirk the laws of the United States by
transferring non-citizen employees to foreign offices or by simply
'70
hiring foreign workers.
Commentators are not alone in questioning Title VII's current
employee coverage. Case law involving the "employee" question
indicates that courts have grappled with this issue since Title VII's
enactment. 71 As a general matter, courts have interpreted Title VII's
employee coverage in a more restrictive manner where the individual
is employed outside the United States by a U.S.-controlled company
compared to where the individual is employed in the United States.
Where the individual is employed in the United States, he or she is
considered an employee for Title VII purpose if he or she is a U.S.
citizen, a legal permanent resident, 72 or legally employed in the U.S.
by a foreign-controlled company. 73 This inclusive practice was
accepted even prior to the 1991 Act, 7 4 and in cases following the 1991
Act, courts have continued to grant protection to both citizens and
noncitizens working in the United States. 75 However, where the
individual is employed outside the United States, courts have not
adopted so generous an interpretation of Title VI's extraterritorial
coverage. Taking a much more restrictive approach, courts have
generally extended protection outside the United States only where
76
the employee is a U.S. citizen.

69.
Id. at 727 (emphasis added).
70.
Id. at 749.
71.
See, e.g., Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2002),
affd, 409 F.3d 414 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Iwata v. Stryker Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D.
Tex. 1999).

72.

See Paul Frantz, International Employment: Antidiscrimination Law

Should Follow Employees Abroad, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 227, 234 (2005) ("With
respect to most provisions of federal employment and labor laws, the Supreme Court
has ruled that these laws apply.., to those noncitizens legally in the U.S.").
73.
See, e.g., Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that Title
VII's plain language provides for the application of Title VII to a foreign company's
domestic operations).
74.
In Aramco, the Court limited Title VII protection domestically to U.S.
citizens and aliens working in the United States. See EEOC v. Arabian. Am. Oil Co.
(Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248-59 (1991).
75.
See, e.g., Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding that a foreign national who applies for a job in the United States is
protected by Title VII, assuming the individual is qualified).
76.
See Iwata, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 604; see also Russell v. Midwest-Werner &
Pflediderer, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 114, 115 (D.Kan. 1997) ("[T]he general rule is that with
respect to foreign employment, Title VII applies only to American citizens employed
abroad by American companies or their foreign subsidiaries."). This Note focuses only
on the former requirement-that the employee is a citizen; however, the latter
requirement-that the corporation is controlled by an U.S. employer-has generated
its own unique debate. See, e.g., Frantz, supra note 72, at 234. The test for Title VII
protection outside the United States is actually two-pronged. Iwata, 59 F. Supp. 2d at
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This inside-outside dichotomy is aptly demonstrated in the
following two cases involving U.S. legal permanent residents denied
Title VII protection due to their status. 77 In Iwata v. Stryker
Corporation,a Japanese citizen and U.S. permanent resident working
for the foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent company brought an action
against the parent company and its Japanese subsidiary alleging race
and national origin discrimination. 78 The court held that the
employee was not protected by Title VII. 79 According to the court,
"[n]on-citizens working outside the United States are not protected
because they are not considered employees. The general rule is that
with respect to foreign employment, Title VII applies only to
American citizens employed abroad by American companies or their
foreign subsidiaries. 80° In the more recent case of Shekoyan v. Sibley
International Corporation,81 the plaintiff was an Armenian-born
permanent legal resident of the United States hired pursuant to a
twenty-one-month employment contract by Sibley International
Corporation (Sibley), a consulting firm headquartered in Washington,
D.C.8 2 Sibley hired the plaintiff as a training advisor for a project
that would be performed in the Republic of Georgia.8 3 The plaintiff
brought a Title VII claim against Sibley alleging national origin
discrimination. 84 The court held that Title VII protection did not
extend to him as a legal permanent resident with a primary
85
workstation in the Republic of Georgia.
The plaintiff in Shekoyan contended that he was entitled to Title
VII protection by virtue of being a U.S. national, even if not a U.S.
citizen.8 6 He relied on Title VII's alien exemption provision and the
Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA) definition of alien to support
his position. The alien exemption provision provides that Title VII
"shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of
aliens outside any State."8 7 The plaintiff argued that he was not an
alien based on the INA's definition, which states that an alien is "any

603. The individual must be (1) a U.S. citizen and (2) employed by a U.S.-controlled
company. Id. This Note focuses only on the first prong of this test.
77.
See also Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512 (5th
Cir. 2001); Hu v. Skadden, 76 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Hu is an ADEA case,
but the ADEA's language also provides extraterritorial coverage of citizens only.
78.
Iwata, 59 F.Supp. 2d at 602.
79.
Id. at 604.
80.
Id. (emphasis added).
81.
217 F.Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, 409 F.3d 414 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
82.
Id. at 62.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id. at 68-69.
86.
Id. at 66.
87.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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person not a citizen or national of the United States."8 8 Because he
was a national, he could not be an alien,8 9 because he was not an
alien, he did not fall under the alien exemption provision, 90 and
because he did not fall under the alien exemption provision, he could
not be excluded from Title VII's protection. Responding to the
plaintiffs assertions, the court cited the INA's definition of national,
which states that a national is "a citizen of the United States, or a
person, who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes
permanent allegiance to the United States."91 The court determined
that the plaintiff was not a national because he had not provided
sufficient evidence that he "owe[d] permanent allegiance to the
United States." 92 This conclusion, however, seems to suggest that he
may have been considered a national had he provided satisfactory
evidence of allegiance. Based on this suggestion, the court might
have extended Title VII protection to a noncitizen where that
noncitizen had provided sufficient proof of allegiance. Nevertheless,
both this case and Iwata stand for the proposition that a legal
permanent resident employed by a U.S.-controlled company abroad is
93
not entitled to Title VII protection.
These two cases illustrate how the employee question arises in
practice. If it is the case that Title VII's employee coverage is more
extensive in the United States than it is outside the country's
borders, there is a troubling double standard at work. Under this
double standard, noncitizens receive treatment similar to citizens in
some instances (in the United States), but are denied such treatment
in other instances (outside the United States). The question becomes
whether this differential treatment can be justified.
One might more confidently answer this question in the negative
after considering a further paradox: some jurisdictions have held that
noncitizen employees may count toward Title VII's minimumemployee threshold requirement, 94 but that these same employees
may not be entitled to substantive protection under the statute. 95 The
Ninth Circuit case Kang v. U. Lim provides one jurisdiction's

88.
See
217 F.Supp. 2d
89.
See
90.
See
91.

Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 409 F.3d 414, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2005), affg
59 (D.D.C. 2002); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
Shekoyan, 409 F.3d at 421.
id.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22).

92.
Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59, 67 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd,
409 F.3d 414 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
93.
Id. at 68-69.
94.
Title VII's minimum threshold requirement states that Title VII applies to
an employer "engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
95.
See, e.g., Kang v. U. Lim, 296 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2002); Morelli v. Cedel, 141
F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998).
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approach to this phenomenon. 9 6 In that case, all of the employees of
the Mexican subsidiary of a U.S. company were noncitizens, yet the
court was willing to count the noncitizen employees in order to reach
the threshold requirement. 97 Basing its decision on the fact that the
two enterprises were sufficiently integrated, 98 the court held that the
employer could meet the minimum-employee threshold by including
in its count the non-citizen employees of its Mexican subsidiary. 99
According to the court "the fact that some of the employees of the
not themselves covered by federal
enterprise are
integrated
antidiscrimination law does not preclude counting them as employees for
the purposes of determining Title VII coverage." 100 Notably, the court,
responding to the plaintiffs claim that Title VII's definition of employee

prohibited counting foreign employees, stated: "The statutory definition
is inclusive rather than restrictive. The term 'employee' is defined to
include U.S. citizens employed by U.S. companies in foreign countries
rather than to prohibit counting non-U.S. citizens." 10 1 Thus, the
Kang court was willing to read the definition of employee broadly, but
only in the context of meeting the minimum threshold
10 2
requirement.
Other jurisdictions, recognizing the controversial nature of the
Kang decision, have held instead that noncitizens working abroad
neither reap the benefits of Title VII protection, nor count toward an
employer's minimum-employee threshold.' 0 3 These courts have based

96.
296 F.3d 810.
Id. at 815-16.
97.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 816.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
This position was also adopted by the Second Circuit in Morelli v. Cedel,
102.
where the court stated, "The nose count of employees relates to the scale of the
employer rather than to the extent of protection." 141 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1998).
Morelli was an ADEA case; however, the ADEA and Title VII contain identical
provisions on the definition of "employee." See Anderson v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 336 F.3d
924 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the "integrated enterprise test" to determine if an
employer met the minimum-threshold requirement, ignoring the status of the
employees); Hirsbrunner v. Ramirez, 438 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.P.R. 2006) (same);
Wildridge v. IER, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 429, 431 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (distinguishing
between the substantive and procedural provisions of Title VII and stating that since
the minimum-threshold requirement is procedural, then non-citizen employees abroad
may be included in the count).
103.
See, e.g., Mousa v. Lauda Air Luftfahrt, 258 F.Supp. 2d 1329, 1337 (S.D.
Fla. 2003); Russell v. Midwest-Werner & Pfleiderer, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 114, 115 (D.
Kan. 1997) ("Unless an American citizen, a person employed abroad is not an
'employee' under Title VII."); Minutillo v. Aqua Signal Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3960, No. 96 C 3529, 1997 WL 156495, *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1997) ("[O]nly a foreign
corporation's United States employees may count towards the jurisdictional
minimum."); Kim v. Dial Serv. Int'l, Inc., 1997 WL 5902, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1997)
("[Tihe foreign employees of a foreign corporation do not count towards the statutory
minimum . . . . [T]he relevant group is the number of employees in the United
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their conclusions on inferences drawn from the statutory language.
For instance, in Mousa v. Lauda Air Lufthardt, where a non-citizen
employed by an Austrian airline sued for religious discrimination
under Title VII, the court held that foreign citizens based abroad who
work exclusively outside the United States. are not included in the
jurisdictional count. 10 4 Making an inference from the language of
Title VII, the court stated, "even though Title VII does not explicitly
state that employees of foreign corporations must work in the United
States to be included in the jurisdictional count, the 1991 Act and the
10 5
statutory language of Title VII strongly support this proposition.'
Still, the court acknowledged that there is a marked split among the
10 6
jurisdictions on this issue.
This paradox provides one basis for extending Title VII
protection beyond U.S. citizens to others employed abroad, but other
bases also exist. Focusing specifically on legal permanent residents,
both the intent and the origin of the alien exemption clause lend
additional support to the argument that Title VII should apply to
legal permanent residents employed by U.S. companies abroad. The
documented intent of the alien exemption clause, as evidenced by its
legislative history, suggests that its purpose was not to exclude legal
permanent residents from protection under Title VII. According to
certain commentators, "[t]he legislative history of the Title VII alien
exemption clause ... illustrates that Congress included the clause to
prevent conflicts with the laws of other nations.' 10 7 Justice Thurgood
Marshall expounded on this point in his dissenting opinion in Aramco
wherein he asserted: "[T]he specific history surrounding the alienexemption provision makes clear that Congress had the situation of
U.S. employers employing citizens of foreign countries in foreign
lands' firmly in mind when it enacted that provision."' 1 8 This
assertion seems to refer to those who are citizens and residents of the
foreign country in which the U.S. company has established operations

States."); Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("Only those employees . . . who work in the United States for twenty or more calendar
weeks per year are to be counted for purposes of determining whether the enterprise is
covered by . . . Title VII."); Rao v. Kenya Airways, Ltd., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8416,
No. 94 Civ. 6103 (CSH), 1995 WL 366305, *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1995) ("[F]oreign
employees of a foreign corporation are not considered employees for purposes of the
statute.").
104.
Mousa, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
105.
Id. at 1335.
106.
Id. at 1336 (stating that several district courts have "found that only those
,employees' that are potentially affected by discriminatory policies may be counted to
determine whether an employer is subject to Title VII").
107.
See Marcus Pinney, A Constitutional Dilemma: The Conflict of Title VII
Alien Exemption Clause with the Civil Rights Acts of 1991, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 707,
727 (2004).
108.
EEOC v. Arabian. Am. Oil. Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 271 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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and not to those who are U.S. legal permanent residents working
abroad. Thus, the alien exemption provision may not have been
intended to limit protection of legal permanent residents, such as the
plaintiffs in Iwata and Shekoyan. Rather, it may have been intended
to limit protection of foreign citizens without valid U.S. immigration
status who are working abroad.10 9
The origin of the alien exemption clause, however, suggests that
Title VII's extraterritorial application should only cover citizens.
Title VII included this provision prior to the 1991 Act-i.e., prior to
when Title VII applied abroad. 110 Congress's decision to retain it
after the 1991 amendments has led some courts to conclude that this
retention reflects Congress's continued opposition to Title VII's
application to noncitizens. 111 After all, the 1991 Act explicitly
extended protection to U.S. citizens in the face of a provision that
prohibited application to aliens. 112 Arguably, to give the alien
exemption clause effect requires that one exclude those who are
noncitizens.
Thus, the intent and the origin of the alien exemption clause
lead to two different to conclusions. The intent suggests Title VII
should reach beyond U.S. citizens, while the origin suggests
otherwise. These differing conclusions have led some commentators
to question the wisdom of Congress's verbatim retention of the alien
exemption clause after the 1991 Act. As one commentator has
suggested, instead of classifying people by alienage, "Congress could
have easily included a provision stating that foreign law applies to
any foreign national working for a U.S. company outside [the]
States." 113 By doing so, there would have been less risk of
discriminating against legal permanent residents of the U.S. 114 If
Congress's true reason for including the alien exemption provision
was to avoid subjecting foreign nationals to U.S. employment laws,
and not to exclude legal permanent residents from protection, then
Congress could have made that purpose clearer.
Besides the origin and intent arguments regarding the alien
exemption clause, one commentator has taken a different approach to
questioning the alien exemption clause as a bar to noncitizen

109.
See Dirig & Sarofsky, supra note 10, at 718. Justice Blackmun also
questioned the logic of distinguishing between citizens and legal permanent residents:
"[Flor most legislative purposes there simply are no meaningful differences between
legal residents and citizens .... " Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
110.
See Dirig & Sarofsky, supra note 10, at 718.
111.
See, e.g., Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l, 409 F.3d 414, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff'g
217 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2002).
112.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006).
113.
Pinney, supra note 107, at 728.
114.
See id.
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protection by questioning the constitutionality of the clause. 115
According to this commentator, "the current interpretation of the
alien exemption clause creates an unconstitutional denial of equal
is ambiguous. 1 16 It is not the
protection, or, in the alternative ....
aim of this Note to engage in an intensive examination of the
constitutionality of the alien exemption clause. Rather, this Note
simply raises the constitutionality question to show further that there
are doubts as to the legitimacy of denying legal permanent residents
protection from extraterritorial employment discrimination.
As the discussion in this section demonstrates, the distinctions
made between citizens and noncitizens for purposes of determining
employee coverage may rest on dubious grounds. This doubt becomes
more apparent when one takes into account the double standards and
paradoxes that currently exist. It becomes even more imperative
that the employee question be resolved as the employment market
becomes increasingly globalized. As one commentator put it, "U.S.
citizens cannot account for the entire overseas workforce. ''117 With
this reality in mind, protection of all employees, not just some, must
be the objective.
B. Debate Two: The Foreign Compulsion Defense as an Escape
Device-The Law Question
Even if an individual qualifies as an employee and the employer
meets all of Title VII's requirements, an employer may still have an
"out"-the foreign compulsion defense.
The 1991 Act not only
affected the definition of employee, but it also added the foreign
compulsion defense to an employer's repertoire of available
defenses. 118 The foreign compulsion defense provides:
It shall not be unlawful ... for an employer (or a corporation controlled
by an employer) . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited by such
section, with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign country
if compliance with such section would cause such employer (or such
corporation), such organization, such agency, or such committee to
violate the law of the foreign country in which such workplace is
119
located.

The foreign compulsion defense essentially functions as a check on
Title VII's reach. An employer may be required to comply with Title
VII in its operations abroad but only to the extent that the employer

See, e.g., id.
115.
116.
See id. at 710-11.
Dirig & Sarofsky, supra note 10, at 727.
117.
118.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b). The Act does not expressly refer to this section
as the "foreign compulsion defense," but it has come to be known as the provision that
provides for this defense.
119.
Id. (emphasis added).
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cannot successfully invoke the foreign compulsion defense. In this
sense, it can serve as a sort of escape device for employers. Viewed as
an escape device, the potential for abuse by employers is one of the
key sources of controversy regarding the defense, 120 especially in light
of that fact that Title VII provides no definition of the types of laws
which may legitimately permit an employer to invoke it. 1 2 1 Thus, the
critical question with respect to the foreign compulsion defense is:
What constitutes "law" sufficient to evade Title VII compliance?
Prior to the addition of the foreign compulsion defense,
employers torn between compliance with Title VII and compliance
with the host country's laws, practices, and customs, relied on the
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) 122 defense to justify
hiring decisions made in violation of Title VII.123 The BFOQ defense
permits an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex, religion, or
national origin where these criteria are "reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. ' 124 Like
the BFOQ defense, the foreign compulsion defense is based on the
premise that there are instances in which U.S. employers have to
12 5
violate Title VII in order to comply with laws of the host country.
However, the foreign compulsion defense is independent of the BFOQ
defense-an employer may raise the foreign compulsion defense even

120.
See Meredith Poznanski Cook, Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of
Title VII: Does the Foreign Compulsion Defense Work?, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
133, 145-53 (1996); see also Madden, supra note 32, at 763 ("[N]o guidance exists as to
what constitutes 'compulsion' sufficient to invoke the [foreign compulsion] defense.");
St. John, supra note 10, at 884-88.
121.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b).
Id. § 2000e-2(e).
122.
123.
See Cook, supra note 120, at 135. Note that the BFOQ defense was not
available to employers to justify discrimination on the basis of race or color. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). Rather, employers could only raise it to justify discriminatory
treatment on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin. Id. Also, the BFOQ
generally does not give employers the right to base their decisions on stereotypes. See
Madden, supra note 32, at 755.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Even though employers could invoke the BFOQ
124.
defense to block Title VII liability, courts did not readily recognize it as a bar to
liability for unlawful employment practices, insisting that the defense was to be used
sparingly. See, e.g., Int'l Union, United Auto v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201
(1991) ("The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly.");
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) ("We are persuaded-by the restrictive
language of § 703 (e), the relevant legislative history, and the consistent interpretation
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-that the [BFOQ] exception was in
fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination ....").According to the Supreme Court, Congress intended the BFOQ
defense to be construed narrowly. See Int'l Union, United Auto, 499 U.S. at 201;
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334.
125.
Madden, supra note 32, at 755.
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if it has no valid BFOQ defense. 126 Still, the foreign compulsion
12 7
defense is more frequently invoked than the BFOQ defense.
The frequency with which employers invoke the foreign
compulsion defense may be related directly to Congress's failure to
define "law" as provided in § 2000e-1(b). 12s As a general matter, the
more imprecise the language of a statute, the more manipulable it is.
The imprecise definition of law invites flexibility in determining
whether the defense applies to a given situation. The EEOC,
recognizing the need for further guidance on the law question, made a
modest attempt to shed light on what constitutes law sufficient to
invoke the defense. In a policy statement issued on the matter, the
EEOC, after articulating the three statutory elements that must be
satisfied to establish the defense, 12 9 added that the employer "must
initially demonstrate that the source of authority on which it relies
constitutes a foreign 'law'."'130 The statement did not elaborate on
how an employer makes such a demonstration. Notably, the EEOC
admitted that "the parameters of [the law] element of the defense are
uncertain." 131 Commentators
have
criticized the
EEOC's
"clarification" of what constitutes foreign law, contending that the
EEOC's test "ignores the practical realities of companies operating
1 32
outside Europe and North America."'
The law question has attracted a range of perspectives, from
those in favor of a broad interpretation to those in favor of a more
restrictive interpretation.
Commentators favoring a broad
interpretation reject the idea that a precise line should be drawn
between the law that is sufficient to invoke the defense and the law

126.
See Maher, supra note 10, at 40.
127.
Certain commentators now refer to the "foreign compulsion defense" as "the
principal provision employers can use to defend against claims of discrimination
abroad." Smith, supra note 59, at 205.
128.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b).
129.
The three statutory elements, as articulated by the EEOC, are as follows:
(1) The action is taken with respect to any employee in a workplace in
a foreign country, where
(2) compliance with Title VII ... would cause the respondent to violate
the law of the foreign country,
(3) in which the workplace is located.
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF TITLE VII AND ADA TO CONDUCT
OVERSEAS AND TO FOREIGN EMPLOYERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1993), available at

http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/extraterritorial-vii-ada.html
[hereinafter EEOC 1993 GUIDELINES].

130.

See id. (emphasis added).

131.

Id.

132.

See, e.g., Smith, supra note 59, at 212.

(emphasis

added)
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that is not. 133 Advocates of this approach argue that Title VII places
employers in the untenable position of choosing between compliance
with Title VII and violating the laws of the host country. 134 In light
of this position, U.S. companies should be shielded from Title VII
sanctions, not only with respect to the host country's formal laws, but
also with respect to its informal laws. 135 These commentators object
to the EEOC's requirement that the employer identify the source of
authority of the law, arguing, inter alia, that such an interpretation
"excludes many other influencing factors."' 136
These influencing
factors include, but are not limited to, social customs, preferences,
and religious practices. 137
Furthermore, according to these
commentators, the EEOC's interpretation is flawed because (1) it is
insensitive to the culture and tradition of the host country, (2) it puts
employers at a competitive disadvantage, (3) it creates hostility
between U.S. and non-U.S. employees, (4) it may still allow employers
to discriminate intentionally, and (5) it results in tension between the
138
United States and the host country.
Opposite this more generous perspective are commentators
adopting the restrictive position captured by the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, which provides: "The defense of foreign
government compulsion is in general available only when the other
state's requirements are embodied in binding laws or regulations
subject to penal or other severe sanction; it is not available when the
second state's orders are given in the form of 'guidance,' informal
communications, or the like."' 139 The EEOC's position appears to
coincide with that of the Restatement, as it recommends the
identification of a specific source of the law invoked. 140 Those falling
into this camp advocate for a clearer articulation of the foreign
compulsion defense to "avoid allowing employers to broadly invoke
the . . . defense.' 141 They call on Congress to "specifically delineate
the kinds of situations that will support the defense."'142 As the
defense stands, these commentators contend that it is too vague and

133.
See, e.g., St. John, supra note 10, at 890-91 (arguing that a "good faith
standard" should be applied to determine whether the defendant's conduct was
compelled).
134.
See generally Smith, supra note 59; St. John, supra note 10.
135.
See Smith, supra note 59, at 869.
136.
Cook, supra note 120, at 146.
137.
See id.
138.
See id. at 148-53.
139.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 cmt. c (1987)

(emphasis added).
140.
See EEOC 1993 GUIDELINES, supra note 129.
141.
See Madden, supra note 32, at 763.
142.

Id.
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too unpredictable, leaving plaintiffs and employers at the mercy of
143
the particular court hearing the case.
There are other commentators who question the wisdom of the
foreign compulsion defense and, more generally, the prudence of
applying Title VII abroad at all. To these commentators, the law
question brings to bear precisely why Title VII's extraterritorial
application is complicated and even unnecessary. 144 According to
these commentators, applying Title VII abroad "creates a myriad of
problems relating to issues of sovereignty, cultural difference, and
conflict between the United States and foreign laws . . . [and]
hampers the ability of United States corporations to compete on a
worldwide scale." 145 From the perspective of these commentators,
Title VII requires employers to choose between, for example, violating
cultural norms of the host country and complying with U.S.
employment laws. 146 However, according to them, the choice is not so
straightforward. To bolster
their positions further, these
commentators claim that U.S. employees are often already protected
under the employment discrimination laws of the host country.147
The complexity of the law question is demonstrated aptly by
cases arising in Islamic countries, in Japan, and in other countries
that subscribe to firm cultural traditions that might be the equivalent
of law in the United States. 148 For instance, in the case of Japanese
culture, the traditional rules of the giri govern many forms of social
interaction, including the employer-employee relationship, and are
commonly referred to as "rules of conduct."149 The giri are not
considered a part of Japan's formal legal structure, yet individuals
still abide by them "in order to function successfully" in Japanese
society. 150 A similar dilemma arises in Islamic countries where the
strictures of the
Muslim faith are essentially the equivalent of law
"on the books.' 15 1 In determining whether an employer may properly
raise the foreign compulsion defense, it may be difficult, if not

Id. at 763 ("Guided by no precise rule or definition, these case-by-case
143.
rulings suggest that a plaintiff bringing a discrimination suit against an employer
operating abroad may never be certain whether some conflicting host country policy
will defeat his claim.").
144.
See Smith, supranote 59, at 193.
145.
Id. at 193-94.
146.
See id.
147.
Id.
148.
Id. at 208 ("Japanese culture and the practices of Islamic countries provide
a good example of an American employer's difficulty in attempting to comply with both
Title VII and the cultural factors which govern employment, yet do not rise to the level
of law.").
149.
See id. at 208-10.
150.
See id. at 208-09.
151.
See id. at 211.
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impossible, for example, to distinguish between the Islamic law and
152
religious commandments.
These two examples illustrate why some commentators insist
that the issue is not as black and white as the 1993 EEOC Guidelines
seem to suggest. They would argue that the EEOC's test is ignorant
to the realities facing companies with operations abroad. 153 Still,
these commentators are willing to concede certain exceptions to this
154
rule, i.e., situations in which Title VII should still be applicable.
These exceptions include, for instance, where the discriminatory
decision is made in the United States instead of on location in the
host country, 155 where an employer sends an employee overseas for
the sole purpose of firing the employee, 156 and where the foreign
company is nothing more than the alter-ego of the U.S.-based parent
157
company.

IV.

MAINTAINING TITLE VII's EFFECTIVENESS WHILE REMAINING

REALISTIC ABOUT ITS REACH: SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO
ADDRESS THE "EMPLOYEE" AND "LAW" QUESTIONS

Title VII has had an undeniable, ground-breaking effect on
discriminatory employment practices. 158 The 1991 Act further
enhanced the statute by extending protection to employees working
abroad for U.S.-based companies.
However, if the statute's
extraterritorial application is to remain meaningful, Congress cannot
ignore the problems identified in this Note. Both the employee
question and the law question indicate that flaws exist in Title VII's
implementation. Each question presents its own challenges that
cannot continue to go unaddressed if Congress is to seriously
undertake ending discriminatory employment practices.
A. Response to the Employee Question: Expansion of the Definition
of Employee to Mimic the Scope of Title VII as Applied in the
United States while Remaining Realistic About the Capabilities
of Title VII
In responding to the employee question, it is important to note at
the outset that Title VII should be given the most extensive reach
possible in order to ensure optimal deterrence of discriminatory

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See id.
See id. at 212.
See id. at 193.
See id. at 221.
See id.

157.

See id.

158.

See, e.g., Dirig & Sarofsky, supra note 10, at 726-27, 734-35.

856

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

IVOL. 40.'833

behavior by employers. Still, one must be practical about Title VII's
capabilities and recognize its limitations. Forcing Title VII to cover
situations best remedied by other means may gradually detract from
Title VII's value as a vehicle to combat discriminatory employment
practices. It is with these points in mind that one must determine
how to resolve the employee question.
As this discussion will
demonstrate, the resolution will necessarily differ with respect to
legal permanent residents and foreign nationals.
As the above discussion indicated, Title VI's current application
within the United States covers U.S. citizens, legal permanent
residents, and others legally working in the United States, but it only
covers U.S. citizens when applied extraterritorially.
The research
conducted in connection with this Note revealed no specific source for
this inconsistency. Furthermore, those who have commented on this
inconsistency find no rational basis for it and question its
fundamental fairness, its consistency with public policy, and its
conformity to the true intent of the statute. 15 9 In the absence of any
compelling reason for Congress to do otherwise, this Note suggests
that Congress amend the definition to be more inclusive. Then the
question is: How inclusive should it be? For reasons stated below,
Title VII's coverage should be expanded to reach legal permanent
residents of the United States working abroad, just as it reaches
these individuals territorially, thus mimicking its application in the
United States. With respect to foreign nationals, an approach outside
of Title VII might be more prudent and also more realistic.
Amending Title VII to cover legal permanent residents can
realistically be accomplished by Congress. It would require only a
change to the existing language to include both citizens and legal
permanent residents.1 6 0 Unlike expansion to cover foreign nationals,
expanding Title VII to cover legal permanent residents is less likely
to raise international comity issues. Legal permanent residents may
not enjoy all of the rights a citizen enjoys, 16 1 but they do enjoy, inter
alia, the right "[t]o be protected by all of the laws of the United
States, [their] state of residence and local jurisdictions." 162 Thus,

159.
See, e.g., id.
160.
Some scholars have suggested that the language be amended to cover "legal
residents," which would cover citizens, legal permanent residents, and foreign
nationals working for U.S. companies abroad. See id. at 726. The approach offered by
this Note is that Title VII should be used to protect citizens and legal permanent
residents and that a more collaborative approach needs to be taken with respect to
foreign nationals.
161.
Legal permanent residents do not enjoy the right to vote in elections. U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Now that You Are a Permanent Resident,
http://www.uscis.gov/ (follow "Permanent Residence (green card)" hyperlink under
"More Information"; then follow "Now That You Are a Permanent Resident" hyperlink
under "Related Links") (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
162.
Id.
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providing Title VII coverage to legal permanent resident seems less
intrusive since they elected to be protected by U.S. law.
Expanding Title VII to cover extraterritorial legal permanent
residents may also alleviate some of the tension surrounding the
treatment of noncitizens for purposes of the minimum-employee
threshold. As was articulated in Mousa, "Title VII's coverage and
definition of 'employee' appear co-extensive. ' 163 This being the case,
those who are not substantively protected by Title VII also should not
count toward the employer's minimum-threshold requirement. 164
The contrary position, taken by the Morelli court, creates a situation
in which noncitizen employees would be "used" to get over the
statutory hurdle but then ignored with respect to their own Title VII
claims.
Under the Morelli rule, the mere presence of foreign
nationals on a U.S. company's payroll would help protected employees
reap the benefits of Title VII, while the foreign nationals would reap
nothing.
This situation is paradoxical in light of Title VII's
fundamental goal of ensuring equal treatment in employment. It is
not likely that Congress intended such an absurdity. Therefore,
Congress should also amend Title VII to require that any employee
who may be counted in the minimum-employee threshold also be
entitled to the substantive protections of the statute.
Although strong arguments can be made for extending Title VII
to legal permanent residents, extension to foreign nationals is more
complicated. Title VII may be ill-suited to reach beyond legal
permanent residents to foreign nationals working for U.S.-controlled
companies.
The more prudent approach to protecting foreign
nationals would be through international agreements with host
countries. International organizations, such as the International
Labor Organization (ILO), 16 5 and international agreements, such as
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the ILO's
Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation, already exist to deal with employment rights. 166 The
question, of course, becomes whether these agreements work in
practice.
Furthermore, what parties would enter into these
agreements? The U.S. government and the government of the host

163.
2003).

164.

Mousa v. Lauda Air Luftahrt, A.G., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337 (S.D. Fl.

Id.

165.
The ILO was created in 1919 "for the purpose of adopting international
standards to cope with the problem of labour conditions involving 'injustice, hardship,
and privation."' Amnesty International, Fact Sheet on the International Labour
Organization
(ILO),
http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/printENGIOR420042002
(last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
166.
See Frantz, supra note 72, at 252-55; see also ILO Convention No. 111
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958,
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm (follow hyperlink to No.
111) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 111].
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country?
The host country government and the U.S. company
operating therein? As a general matter, international agreements
tend to be complex instruments, the realistic enforceability of which
is often called into question. 167 However, it is questionable whether
the enforceability of a Title VII claim by a foreign national employed
by a U.S. company abroad is a more sound approach. Certain
commentators have already noted the difficulty of enforcing Title VII
with respect to foreign nationals. 168 The point here is not to suggest
that Title VII is completely inadequate in the context of foreign
nationals suing U.S. employer abroad (indeed, Title VII could serve as
an excellent model for the international agreement). Rather, the
point is to raise the question of whether U.S. federal legislation is the
proper mechanism by which to accomplish this end and to motivate
the U.S. government and international bodies to address this issue.
B. Response to the Law Question: Congress Must Provide More
Guidance to Courts and Employers as to When Employers
May Legitimately Invoke the Foreign Compulsion Defense
Working to expand Title VII's reach to U.S. citizens and legal
permanent residents may be a pointless exercise if employers have
the ability to invoke the foreign compulsion defense in order to skirt
Title VII's requirements. Without a more precise definition of "law,"
or at least advice about how to approach the law question when it
arises, the foreign compulsion defense may serve as more of a check
on the scope of Title VII than the drafters intended, and it may
ultimately work against the overall goals of Title VII. 1 69 Therefore,
Congress must provide courts and employers with more guidance as
to when an employer can successfully invoke the defense.
One of the main dilemmas with respect to the foreign compulsion
defense is that it is difficult to devise a straightforward way to take
into account the traditions, customs, and rules of conduct of the host
country. As this Note has indicated, these cultural formalities often
function as law under the standards of foreign countries even though
170
they are not necessarily considered law under U.S. standards.
Petitioning Congress to provide a concrete rule as to what constitutes
law may not be a realistic request because law is an amorphous
concept when considered from a global perspective. The varying
perspectives around the world on what constitutes law are not
conducive to producing a single rule covering all situations. It is not
just a matter of Congress adding two or three words to the current

167.
See Dirig & Sarofsky, supra note 10, at 726-48.
168.
Id.
169.
Recall from above that the purpose of Title VII was broadly articulated by
the Supreme Court.
170.
See St. John, supra note 10, at 889-90.
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statutory provision. It would be virtually impossible for Congress to
provide a bright-line rule delineating what constitutes law and what
does not constitute law in nearly 200 countries around the world. In
light of this complexity, the first step to attacking the law question is
acknowledging the impossibility of devising a concrete, generally
applicable rule. The next step is to consider a more pragmatic
approach.
Reciprocity agreements between the United States and foreign
governments, under which each country would agree to apply the
other's employment laws either through a treaty or through some
other form of international agreement, may be one pragmatic way to
approach the question. 171 By reaching such an agreement, some of
the issues regarding sovereignty might be avoided. 17 2 Of course, U.S.
employment laws and those of the host country may not be identical,
but these inconsistencies could be addressed in the agreement. The
inconsistencies may even be overstated because some countries
already have prohibitions on discriminatory employment practices
similar to Title VII's prohibitions in place. 173 The feasibility of
reciprocity agreements is even more promising if one considers that
165 countries have ratified ILO Convention No. 111. 174 This
convention was adopted in 1958 and has been well-received by a
majority of countries around the world. 175 Interestingly, the United
States has not ratified this convention and stands out from those
countries that have ratified it. As a starting point, the United States
needs to reconsider its position on ratification because the ideas
176
expressed in this Convention echo those expressed in Title VII.
Importantly, the stamp of approval from the countries which have
ratified the Convention suggests that they would be open to
reciprocity agreements. Reciprocity agreements, therefore, are one
viable option for resolving the law question.
As stated earlier, it is impractical to ask Congress to provide a
universal definition of law. Still, Congress will have to amend the
language of the foreign compulsion defense to reflect this new
approach. It should amend it by adding the following statement:
"Law" sufficient to permit an employer to raise this defense must
consist of an actual mandate by the foreign government which can be
furnished in writing in an official document; alternatively, employers

171.
See Smith, supra note 59, at 221.
172.
See id.
173.
See Dirig & Sarofsky, supra note 10, at 734.
174.
International Labour Organization Homepage, Ratifications of Convention
No. 111, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C 111 (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
175.
See ILO Convention No. 111, supranote 166.
176.
Convention No. 111 defines discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion or
preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national
extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of
opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation." Id. at art. 1.

860

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40.833

may rely upon a treaty or other international agreement signed by all

relevant parties which specifies the traditions, customs, or rules of
conduct that function as the equivalent of "law" in the host country.

Such a clause would provide necessary guidance and would also make
recognition of the defense more predictable.

V.

CONCLUSION

It took Congress twenty-seven years to extend Title VII
extraterritorially. Congress likely thought it was sounding the death
knell on the question when it enacted the 1991 Act. As it turns out,
clearing one hurdle has led to additional ones. Title VII continues to
be instrumental legislation in the fight against discriminatory
employment practices, but Congress must address the issues raised
in this Note with respect to the definition of employee and the
definition of law if it wants to maintain the statute's effectiveness.
Without addressing these two issues, courts will be forced to fill in
the gaps with their own potentially erroneous interpretations, and
commentators will continue to add to the confusion by offering
varying perspectives on what the interpretation should be. When
Congress does decide to amend the statute-undoubtedly, it will have
to be done-it will be necessary to keep in mind that Title VII can
only go so far without sacrificing its effectiveness. Of course, Title
VII could cover citizens, legal permanent residents, and foreign
nationals, but the question is, should it? What works in theory may
not work in practice. From a practical standpoint, protection should
only be extended to citizens and legal permanent residents; protection
of foreign nationals may be best accomplished by international
agreement. Also from a practical standpoint, the law question cannot
be resolved by calling on Congress to provide one unitary definition of
law to apply in all situations. The more prudent approach to the law
question would be, again, to recognize the limitations of Title VII and
to pursue other means to achieve protection.
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